The Pesky Persistence of Class Action Tolling in Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation by Grabill, Jeremy T.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 74 | Number 2
Eastern District of Louisiana: The Nation's MDL
Laboratory - A Symposium
Winter 2014
The Pesky Persistence of Class Action Tolling in
Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation
Jeremy T. Grabill
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation




The Pesky Persistence of Class Action Tolling in Mass 
Tort Multidistrict Litigation 
Jeremy T. Grabill* 
ABSTRACT 
Notwithstanding the fact that personal injury claims are no 
longer certified as class actions for purposes of adjudication (i.e., as 
“litigation classes”), the class action tolling doctrine is alive and 
well in various jurisdictions across the country, and it is a feature of 
state law that transferee courts must grapple with in mass tort 
multidistrict litigations (MDLs). The pesky persistence of the class 
action tolling doctrine allows individual statutes of limitations for 
potential plaintiffs to be tolled in many jurisdictions by virtue of the 
mere filing of a putative personal injury class action in a related 
case. In contemporary mass tort MDLs, which are increasingly 
being resolved by non-class aggregate settlements, it is simply not 
true that “a little tolling never hurt anyone.” Rather, by permitting 
and/or encouraging potential plaintiffs to sit in the shadows and not 
come forward to assert their claims, the class action tolling doctrine 
can delay and altogether undermine efforts to resolve modern mass 
tort litigation by creating disabling uncertainty about current and 
future plaintiff populations. 
This Article argues that transferee courts should reexamine their 
current tendency to defer consideration of class action issues in 
mass tort MDLs; instead, transferee courts should issue an 
“omnibus class action pretrial order” at the inception of any MDL 
that contains at least one putative personal injury class action. That 
omnibus order can rely on the long line of well-established 
precedent rejecting certification of personal injury litigation classes 
and should do at least four things: (i) strike all current and future 
personal injury class allegations from all current and future 
complaints in the MDL; (ii) deny all current and future requests for 
personal injury claims to be certified as litigation classes; (iii) 
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explicitly provide that the purpose of the order is to suspend any and 
all tolling of the applicable statute(s) of limitations that might 
otherwise occur as a result of the class action tolling doctrine; and 
(iv) make clear that the parties are not precluded from subsequently 
seeking certification of one or more settlement classes. Such an 
order would short-circuit any harmful impact the class action 
tolling doctrine might otherwise impose without precluding the 
parties from subsequently seeking to use the class action device to 
implement a global settlement. Ultimately, this is a modest 
modification of current MDL practice that should be implemented in 
mass tort cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts may authorize the use of class actions in two essential 
ways—the claims of one or more class representatives may be 
certified for purposes of adjudication (“litigation classes”) or for 
purposes of settlement (“settlement classes”).1 Although mass tort 
litigation continues to be occasionally resolved via class action 
settlements,2 it is essentially unquestionable that personal injury 
claims can no longer be certified as litigation classes.3 As the 
                                                                                                             
 1. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to 
Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 775, 793 (2010) (noting that “the settlement class . . . appears to 
have displaced the litigation class as the dominant form of class certification,” 
although “the existing empirical evidence is consistent with the thesis that class 
certification [in general] has become less likely” following the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)). In federal 
court, the class certification analysis under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure differs slightly depending on whether the parties are seeking 
certification of a litigation class or a settlement class. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
Stepping back from the distinction between litigation classes and settlement 
classes for a moment, “[t]he paradigmatic application of the modern class action 
[as a procedural vehicle] . . . is to make civil claims marketable that otherwise 
would not be brought on an individual basis.” Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99 (2009). 
 2. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 3. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1089 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(identifying “a national trend to deny class certification in drug or medical product 
liability/personal injury cases”). The discussion of “personal injury” claims in this 
Article should be understood to include claims for monetary damages arising from 
both non-fatal and fatal injuries. It should also be noted here that issues concerning 
tolling for non-personal injury claims are beyond the scope of this Article, largely 
because certain non-personal injury claims may still be amenable to class 
certification in mass tort litigation. See, e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading 
Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming certification of 
a class of consumers that had purchased allegedly defective washing machines); 
Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming certification of 
two consumer fraud classes in defective window litigation and noting that “[w]hile 
consumer fraud class actions present problems that courts must carefully consider 
before granting certification, there is not and should not be a rule that they never 
can be certified”); Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-12234, 2012 WL 




American Law Institute recently explained, “This development 
reflects many factors,” including “difficulties presented by choice-
of-law problems” and “the need for individual evidence of exposure, 
injury, and damages.”4 Thus, whenever a discrete accident or event, 
harmful substance or condition, or defective drug, device, or product 
is suspected of causing similar injuries to multiple people in the 
United States, plaintiffs must generally pursue relief by filing 
individual lawsuits—and the “mass tort” moniker refers to the 
resulting influx of hundreds or thousands of related cases into the 
judicial system.5 Those individual cases will often be filed in both 
state and federal courts, and while some cases may remain in state 
courts for jurisdictional reasons,6 it is increasingly common for 
                                                                                                             
 
957633 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2012) (denying defendant’s motion to decertify a 
single-state class of former smokers that was only asserting claims for medical 
monitoring); Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597 (E.D. La. 2006) 
(certifying a class of plaintiffs asserting claims for property damage arising from 
an oil spill during Hurricane Katrina). 
 4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION § 1.02, at 25 (2010). See also infra Part II.A. 
 5. The “mass tort” moniker may be somewhat misleading because often the 
claims that arise in such situations go beyond traditional tort claims and can also 
include a variety of contract, warranty, fraud, economic loss, environmental, and 
statutory claims. That said, mass torts come in two varieties—they are either 
localized or dispersed in space and time. See Jeremy T. Grabill, Multistate Class 
Actions Properly Frustrated by Choice-of-Law Complexities: The Role of Parallel 
Litigation in the Courts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 299, 304–05 (2005) (discussing “single 
situs” and “widespread” torts); see also Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for 
Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 129, 129 (1989) (“[T]here are two forms of the ‘mass tort.’ In one, the same 
event killed or injured the victims. In the other, injuries occur over a period of time 
and at different locations but have the same cause, typically a defective product.”); 
Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1105, 1120 (2010) (“Mass tort litigation today . . . focuses overwhelmingly 
on alleged product defects that are not of a one-off nature but, instead, concern the 
design of products or the warnings conveyed with them—aspects that implicate all 
those who consumed the disputed product, not just an unlucky few who might 
encounter an anomalous manufacturing defect.”). 
 6. Recent expansions of federal subject matter jurisdiction, however, have 
increased the degree of aggregation that can be accomplished in the federal courts. 
For example, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) expanded federal 
diversity jurisdiction over putative class actions where the amount in controversy 
exceeds $5 million and minimal diversity exists between the parties (i.e., where 
“any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any 
defendant”). See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1332(d), 1453, and 1711–15); see also infra Part IV.C. Another example is the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent holding that federal district courts may exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over class members’ claims even if those claims do not 
independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, provided that “at 




related mass tort cases pending in federal courts across the country 
to be transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
(JPML) from their home districts to one “transferee” judge for 
“coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” pursuant to the 
multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute.7 
Despite these developments, plaintiffs’ lawyers continue to file 
“putative” personal injury class actions. In this context, the term 
“putative” is used during the period prior to a court ruling on class 
certification to refer to a case that has been styled as a class action in 
the complaint.8 Why do putative personal injury class actions 
continue to be filed? It is conceivable that some plaintiffs’ lawyers 
do so with the hope that such cases will be assigned to rogue trial 
court judges willing to certify litigation classes, thereby placing 
significant pressure on the defendants to settle.9 It could also be 
                                                                                                             
 
least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy 
requirement.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 
(2005). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See generally Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & 
Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 2323, 2326–30 (2008) (discussing the modern multidistrict litigation 
process); John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2225 n.1 (2008) (“In MDL parlance, the court to which an 
action or actions are transferred (or centralized) under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 is referred 
to as the ‘transferee’ court, and the court from which the action or actions are 
transferred is called the ‘transferor’ court.”). 
 8. In other words, although plaintiffs’ counsel may craft a complaint as a 
class action, the case does not actually obtain class action status until a court 
certifies the class as complying with the necessary statutory requirements. 
Similarly, a “putative” class member is someone who falls within the complaint’s 
class definition—but again, a court order certifying the class is necessary before 
anyone actually becomes a class member. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 
133 S. Ct. 1345, 1346 (2013) (“[A] plaintiff who files a proposed class action 
cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified.”). 
Nevertheless, putative class members may enjoy certain judicial protections. See, 
e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.12 (4th ed. 2004) (“Rule 23(d) 
authorizes the court to regulate communications with potential class members, 
even before certification.”); see also, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 
2011 WL 323866 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) (regulating the Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility’s communications with putative class members); Edward F. Sherman, The 
BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict Litigation 
Judges, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 237 (2011) (discussing Judge Barbier’s regulation of 
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility’s communications with putative class members in 
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill litigation). 
 9. See infra note 65. Prior to 1998, the only generally available avenue for 
immediate review of an order certifying a class action was via a petition for a writ 
of mandamus—but, of course, “mandamus is issued only in extraordinary cases.” 
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1995) (“An order 




possible that plaintiffs’ lawyers file putative personal injury class 
actions simply as placeholders for possible settlement classes down 
the line, notwithstanding the modern trend toward the use of non-
class aggregate settlements in mass tort litigation.10 But the 
predominant reason behind the continued filing of putative personal 
injury class actions is likely the persistence of a favorable legal 
doctrine known as “class action tolling.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court originally recognized the class action 
tolling doctrine in 1974 in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. 
Utah.11 Generally, the class action tolling doctrine provides that the 
filing of a putative class action tolls or suspends the applicable 
statute(s) of limitations for all putative class members until class 
certification is denied.12 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
American Pipe, the class action tolling doctrine has been adopted 
                                                                                                             
 
certifying a class is not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . 
and it has been held not to fit any of the exceptions to the rule that confines federal 
appellate jurisdiction to final decisions.”). But see Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 
F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996) (exercising jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal 
of a class certification order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and decertifying the 
class). As a matter of federal procedure, the availability of appellate review for 
orders “granting or denying class-action certification” was expanded in 1998. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order 
granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for 
permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is 
entered.”). Even today, however, there is no absolute right to appeal a federal court 
order certifying a class action, and if the court of appeals denies permission to 
appeal under Rule 23(f), mandamus may still be the only way to seek immediate 
review of such an order. 
 10. See generally Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort 
Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123 (2012) (discussing the emerging non-
class opt-in paradigm for aggregate mass tort settlements). 
 11. 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
 12. See infra Part III.A.  It is worth emphasizing that tolling generally stops 
upon the district court’s denial of class certification. That said, the law appears to 
be somewhat unclear regarding whether this general rule should be modified when 
an order denying certification is subsequently reversed on appeal. Compare 
Giovanniello v. ALM Media, LLC, 726 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We now take 
this opportunity to join our sister circuits and hold that American Pipe tolling does 
not extend beyond the denial of class status.”), with Hall v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins. Co., 727 F.3d 372, 376 n.8 (5th Cir. 2013) (“If a denial of certification is 
reversed on appeal, the putative class members can claim the benefit of 
uninterrupted tolling from the original class action filing date.”). In any event, that 
issue has been addressed elsewhere, and it is beyond the scope of this Article 
given that orders denying certification of personal injury claims are rarely, if ever, 
reversed on appeal. See generally Kevin Welsh, Comment, Collision Course: How 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) Has Silently Undermined the Prohibition on 
American Pipe Tolling During Appeals of Class Certification Denials, 73 LA. L. 
REV. 1183 (2013). 




and applied in different ways to state law personal injury claims by 
various state courts and federal courts sitting in diversity.13 And 
despite the demise of the personal injury litigation class, the class 
action tolling doctrine persists in a variety of forms and 
permutations in jurisdictions across the country; thus, it is a feature 
of state law with which MDL transferee courts must grapple. 
Notwithstanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s statement 
that “[a]t an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a 
class representative, the court must determine by order whether to 
certify the action as a class action,” the issue of class certification is 
often deferred in contemporary mass tort MDL practice.14 For 
example, in the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill multidistrict 
litigation, plaintiffs’ counsel filed multiple putative class actions and 
various master complaints that also included class action 
allegations.15 But in an early pretrial order, the transferee court 
imposed a broad stay of all motion practice and discovery on class 
certification issues within the MDL.16 Similarly, plaintiffs’ counsel 
filed various putative class actions as part of the prominent MDL 
involving the pharmaceutical drug Vioxx, but the transferee court 
did not address the issue of class certification for personal injury 
claims until more than a year and a half after the MDL was 
created.17 Unfortunately, and perhaps unbeknownst to transferee 
                                                                                                             
 13. For a discussion of the various permutations of the class action tolling 
doctrine, see infra Part III.B. 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). From 1966 until 2003, this provision read as 
follows: “As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a 
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.” 
The change from “as soon as practicable” to “at an early practicable time” was 
intended to recognize that “many circumstances may justify deferring the 
certification decision,” such as allowing time for limited discovery “in aid of the 
certification decision” or for exploring “designation of class counsel” or “interim 
counsel.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee note (2003).  In his concurring 
opinion in American Pipe, Justice Blackmun relied on the earlier version of this 
provision to assume that the class certification decision “will normally be made 
expeditiously.” Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 15. See infra notes 92–99 and accompanying text for further details about the 
BP Deepwater Horizon MDL. 
 16. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010) (Pretrial Order 
No. 11) para. VII, available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders 
/PTO11.pdf (“Local Rule 23.1 and Federal Rule 23 motion practice and discovery 
on class certification issues is hereby stayed for all cases until further order of this 
Court.”). 
 17. Compare In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006) 
(denying plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a nationwide personal injury class 
action), with In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005) 
(creating MDL 1657). 




courts, the statutes of limitations for putative class members are 
likely to be tolled in many jurisdictions until the transferee court 
affirmatively strikes personal injury class allegations or otherwise 
denies class action status to personal injury claims styled as putative 
class actions. 
This Article describes the ways in which the pesky persistence 
of the class action tolling doctrine can undermine efforts to resolve 
modern mass tort litigation. In the MDL context, given the threat of 
remand that the MDL statute confers upon transferee courts, it is 
inevitable that a time will come when the parties begin thinking 
about a potential global settlement.18 And when that time comes, it 
is extremely helpful—if not essential—that the universe of plaintiffs 
making claims be known with relative certainty so that appropriate 
valuation decisions can be made and the defendants can have 
reasonable comfort that a wave of new claims will not emerge after 
a settlement is announced. Class action tolling frustrates both of 
those conditions by allowing and even encouraging potential 
plaintiffs to sit in the shadows and not come forward to assert their 
claims.19 In light of the reality that personal injury litigation classes 
are no longer certified, putative class members clearly should not 
benefit from the windfall of an extended limitations period simply 
because someone has filed a putative personal injury class action in 
a related case. Indeed, as Justice Blackmun noted in his concurring 
opinion in American Pipe, the Court’s decision “must not be 
regarded as encouragement to lawyers . . . to frame their pleadings 
as a class action, intentionally, to attract and save members of the 
purported class who have slept on their rights.”20 
Contrary to the suggestion of several prior commentators, 
however, it is not necessary or advisable for the class action tolling 
                                                                                                             
 18. The MDL statute “obligates the [JPML] to remand any pending case to its 
originating court when . . . pretrial proceedings have run their course.” Lexecon 
Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34 (1998). The usual 
procedure is for the transferee court to “suggest” to the JPML that remand is 
appropriate. See generally In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 
F. Supp. 2d 74, 76–78 (D. Me. 2011) (discussing the standards to be used in 
determining “when—short of trial—the transferee court’s work is done”). 
 19. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the 
Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1159 
(2011) (noting that class action tolling “allows a single plaintiff to satisfy the 
limitations period for a vast group of yet unidentified potential plaintiffs who have, 
in many instances, taken no action at all to pursue their claims”). 
 20. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). See also Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (reiterating Justice Blackmun’s precautionary words). 




doctrine to be abolished in its entirety.21 Moreover, abolition may 
not even be practical given that the class action tolling doctrine has 
been adopted as a matter of state law in various jurisdictions. Thus, 
even if one sought to eliminate the doctrine only in the mass tort 
context, short of convincing various state courts of last resort to 
abandon their prior decisions embracing class action tolling 
principles, coordinated legislative reform would need to occur in 
jurisdictions throughout the country.22 Rather, the modest proposal 
set forth herein is that transferee courts should reexamine their 
current tendency to defer consideration of class action issues in mass 
tort MDLs and instead issue an “omnibus class action pretrial order” 
at the inception of any MDL that contains at least one putative 
personal injury class action. That omnibus order could be entered by 
the transferee court sua sponte or upon a motion by the defendant(s), 
and it should do at least four things: (i) strike all current and future 
personal injury class allegations from all current and future 
complaints in the MDL; (ii) deny all current and future requests for 
personal injury claims to be certified as litigation classes; (iii) 
explicitly provide that the purpose of the order is to suspend any and 
all tolling of the applicable statute(s) of limitations that might 
otherwise occur as a result of the class action tolling doctrine; and 
(iv) make clear that the parties are not precluded from subsequently 
seeking certification of one or more settlement classes. 
The current practice of transferee courts to defer consideration 
of class action issues in mass tort MDLs is understandable given the 
predictable and obvious result of the certification inquiry (e.g., 
certification of personal injury litigation classes will be denied) and 
                                                                                                             
 21. For example, it has been argued that class action tolling should not be 
applied in mass tort litigation because “notice in class actions will rarely be 
adequate to apprise mass tort personal injury defendants of the evidence they need 
to gather” to defend against each class member’s claim “before that evidence 
becomes stale.” Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The 
Impropriety of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 532, 577, 580 (1996). Other practitioners have made similar 
arguments against the application of the class action tolling doctrine in mass tort 
litigation. See JOHN H. BEISNER & JESSICA D. MILLER, LITIGATE THE TORTS, NOT 
THE MASS: A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING HOW MASS TORTS ARE 
ADJUDICATED (2009), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/beisner09.pdf. 
 22. In order to abolish the class action tolling doctrine either in whole or in 
part, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and analogous state law rules 
of procedure would need to be amended to provide either that personal injury 
claims cannot be certified as litigation classes or that the filing of putative personal 
injury class actions does not toll any otherwise applicable statute(s) of limitations 
for putative class members. Additionally, or alternatively, state legislatures could 
amend their statutes of limitations for personal injury claims to provide explicitly 
that the filing of a putative personal injury class action does not toll the time 
periods established by those statutes for unnamed putative class members. 




the reality that more pressing matters are bound to exist. Such a 
triaged approach, however, allows the class action tolling doctrine to 
wreak havoc in the background by creating uncertainty about 
plaintiff populations. The omnibus class action pretrial order that 
this Article proposes would short-circuit any harmful impact the 
class action tolling doctrine might otherwise impose and need not 
unduly distract transferee courts because the order can be based on 
the long line of well-established precedent refusing to certify 
personal injury claims as litigation classes.23 Moreover, the omnibus 
class action pretrial order would not preclude the transferee court 
from subsequently certifying a personal injury settlement class 
because (i) a district court’s class certification decision is always 
subject to revision and (ii) the traditional Rule 23 analysis is 
modified in the settlement class context, such that an order denying 
certification for a litigation class cannot have collateral estoppel 
effect on a subsequent request to certify a settlement class. 
Ultimately, both law and practice must account for the dual realities 
that personal injury class actions are no longer certified for purposes 
of adjudication and that the efficient and successful resolution of 
modern mass tort litigation often requires relative certainty 
regarding current and future plaintiff populations. 
II. THE DEMISE OF PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION CLASSES AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF MASS TORT MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 
Before delving into the details of how the class action tolling 
doctrine operates and impacts contemporary mass tort litigation, it is 
first necessary to discuss why personal injury claims are no longer 
certified as litigation classes and how the judiciary has turned to 
multidistrict litigation as the primary mechanism for organizing and 
resolving mass tort claims in the post-class action era. This 
preliminary discussion will not only provide helpful procedural 
context for understanding the ways in which the class action tolling 
doctrine currently threatens the fair and efficient resolution of mass 
tort litigation, but it will also set forth the legal justifications that 
transferee courts may quickly rely on to issue an “omnibus class 
action pretrial order” at the inception of any MDL that contains at 
least one putative personal injury class action. 
                                                                                                             
 23. See supra notes 3–4; see also infra Part II.A. 




A. Personal Injury Litigation Classes Are No Longer Certified 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the use 
of class actions in the federal courts.24 As amended in 1966, Rule 23 
contemplates various forms of class actions—most notably the Rule 
23(b)(3) damages “opt-out” class action.25 So-called “(b)(3)” class 
actions may be maintained if common questions of law or fact 
predominate over individualized issues and class resolution is 
superior to other available methods of adjudication.26  Provided that 
a court finds that all of the necessary statutory requirements are 
satisfied, a single class representative seeking money damages can 
litigate and/or settle on behalf of—and bind—all similarly situated 
individuals who do not take the affirmative step of opting out of the 
class action.27 
                                                                                                             
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. As an initial matter, Rule 23 requires that four 
prerequisites be satisfied before any class action may be certified: numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
The jurisprudence has recognized a fifth prerequisite, namely “ascertainability.” 
See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2013 WL 4437225 (3d Cir. Aug. 
21, 2013). 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 26. Id. The other types of class actions include Rule 23(b)(1)(A) incompatible 
standards classes, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund classes, and Rule 23(b)(2) classes 
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. Unlike the (b)(3) class action, the (b)(1) 
and (b)(2) varieties are “mandatory” class actions, meaning that “Rule 23 does not 
provide for absent class members to receive notice and to exclude themselves from 
class membership as a matter of right.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 
833 n.13 (1999). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has described the 
various types of class actions as follows: 
Under Rule 23, the different categories of class actions, with their 
different requirements, represent a balance struck in each case between 
the need and efficiency of a class action and the interests of class 
members to pursue their claims separately or not at all. The different 
types of class actions are categorized according to the nature or effect of 
the relief being sought. The (b)(1) class action encompasses cases in 
which the defendant is obliged to treat class members alike or where 
class members are making claims against a fund insufficient to satisfy all 
claims. The (b)(2) class action, on the other hand, was intended to focus 
on cases where broad, class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is 
necessary. Finally, the (b)(3) class action was intended to dispose of all 
other cases in which a class action would be “convenient and desirable,” 
including those involving large-scale, complex litigation for money 
damages. Limiting the different categories of class actions to specific 
kinds of relief clearly reflects a concern for how the interests of the class 
member will vary, depending on the nature of the class injury alleged and 
the nature of the relief sought. 
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum, 151 F.3d 402, 411–12 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 27. “For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class 
members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including 




The Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules who 
drafted the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 recognized that the new 
(b)(3) class action was “the most adventuresome” innovation of 
those amendments.28 The Advisory Committee itself even noted at 
the time that a “‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous 
persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the 
likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of 
liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the 
individuals in different ways.”29 Only in the past twenty years, 
however, have courts taken this guidance to heart and begun to 
almost categorically refuse certification of personal injury litigation 
classes.30 As described below, the two most commonly cited 
roadblocks to the certification of personal injury litigation classes 
are the lack of class cohesion and the existence of choice-of-law 
complexities. Additionally, with so much at stake in mass tort 
litigation, several courts have also expressed discomfort with one 
adversarial proceeding resolving the rights and liabilities of all 
interested parties once and for all. 
1. Lack of Class Cohesion 
The downfall of personal injury litigation classes must be traced 
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1997 rejection of a proposed class 
action settlement of personal injury claims in Amchem Products, 
Inc. v. Windsor.31 Although the ambitious and wide-ranging putative 
                                                                                                             
 
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Among other things, such notice must “clearly and 
concisely state in plain, easily understood language . . . that the court will exclude 
from the class any member who requests exclusion [and] the time and manner for 
requesting exclusion.” Id. Notwithstanding these provisions, a leading empirical 
study has found that opt-out rates are “trivially small in the mass of cases.” 
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in 
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
1529, 1532–34 (2004). 
 28. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (quoting 
Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 
(1969)). 
 29. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 844 n.20 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s notes (1966)). 
 30. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 5, at 1170 (“The modern Rule 23 
represented the new procedural kid on the block in 1966, a vital innovation at the 
time. As the rule now enters its middle age, one might say that a more elaborated 
sense has emerged not only about its genuine usefulness but also about its well-
taken limitations.”). 
 31. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). This is not to suggest, however, that no court had 
rejected certification of personal injury claims prior to Amchem. For example, in 




settlement class in Amchem presented a variety of problematic 
issues that a more modest litigation class could largely avoid, the 
Supreme Court’s discussion of the lack of “class cohesion” in 
Amchem laid the foundation that subsequent courts have relied upon 
to reject certification of litigation classes in even routine putative 
personal injury class actions.32 
In Amchem, the Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s 
certification of a “sprawling” settlement class of “hundreds of 
thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals” connected by the 
“commonality” that “[e]ach was, or some day may be, adversely 
affected by past exposure to asbestos products manufactured by one 
or more of 20 companies.”33 The putative personal injury class 
consisted of “persons occupationally exposed to defendants’ 
asbestos products, and members of their families.”34 The Supreme 
Court agreed with the Third Circuit’s reasoning that the putative 
class failed to satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of 
Rule 23(a) and the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).35 
                                                                                                             
 
1984, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus 
directing the district judge presiding over the Bendectin multidistrict litigation to 
vacate his order certifying a Rule 23(b)(1) class of plaintiffs allegedly injured by 
in utero exposure to the prescription drug. See In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 
749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984). Other courts had previously rejected class 
certification of personal injury claims under Rule 23(b)(3) as well. See, e.g., 
Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 398–99 (E.D. Va. 1975) 
(refusing to certify class action in litigation arising from an aircraft crash in 
Indonesia). But the pre-Amchem decisions by and large did not focus on the core 
lack-of-cohesion defect in putative personal injury class actions identified in 
Amchem. 
 32. See infra notes 43–45. Two years later, in Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815, the 
Supreme Court held that a similar asbestos settlement class could not be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). The Supreme Court’s discussion in Ortiz focused 
primarily on the “conditions for certifying a mandatory settlement class on a 
limited fund theory,” and not on the lack of class cohesion in personal injury 
cases. Id. at 821. However, by referencing “our deep-rooted historic tradition that 
everyone should have his own day in court” and the “inherent tension between 
representative suits and the day-in-court ideal,” Justice Souter’s majority opinion 
in Ortiz implicitly reinforced the rationale of Amchem. Id. at 846 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
 33. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597. As the Supreme Court explained, a “settlement 
class” is one that is “not intended to be litigated.” Id. at 601. In Amchem, for 
example, “within the space of a single day, January 15, 1993, the settling parties . . . 
presented to the District Court a complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement 
agreement, and a joint motion for conditional class certification.” Id. at 601–02. 
 34. Id. at 605. 
 35. The Supreme Court also suggested, though did not decide, that it might 
not “ever” be possible to give “class action notice sufficient under the Constitution 




The adequacy of representation defect in Amchem resulted from 
the novel structure of the wider settlement landscape that was being 
pursued in the asbestos litigation at that time. The putative class in 
Amchem was crafted by counsel to include only future claimants that 
had not yet filed individual lawsuits (in many cases, likely because 
an injury had not yet manifested); the claims of current plaintiffs 
with manifest injuries were settled separately by the same counsel as 
part of a two-pronged attempt to respond to the “asbestos-litigation 
crisis.”36 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Third 
Circuit’s conclusion that “serious intra-class conflicts precluded the 
class from meeting the adequacy of representation requirement.”37 
As the Supreme Court explained: “[T]he interests of those within the 
single class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured, 
the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs 
against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, 
inflation-protected fund for the future.”38 Ultimately, as the Third 
Circuit had concluded, “an undivided set of representatives could 
not adequately protect the discrete interests of both currently 
afflicted and exposure-only claimants.”39 Although the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the adequacy of representation defect in Amchem 
obviously remains relevant, counsel can generally avoid this pitfall 
                                                                                                             
 
and Rule 23 . . . to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous” as current and 
future spouses and children of asbestos victims. Id. at 628. 
 36. Id. at 597–601 (discussing the findings of the March 1991 Report of the 
United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation). 
 37. Id. at 610 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630 
(3d Cir. 1996)). 
 38. Id. at 626. The Third Circuit had made the same essential point: “The 
[exposure-only plaintiffs] would rationally want protection against inflation for 
distant recoveries. They would also seek sturdy back-end opt-out rights and 
causation provisions that can keep pace with changing science and medicine, 
rather than freezing in place the science of 1993. Already injured parties, in 
contrast, would care little about such provisions and would rationally trade them 
for higher current payouts.” Id. at 610–11 (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 39. Id. at 611. See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) 
(“[I]t is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders of present and 
future claims (some of the latter involving no physical injury and attributable to 
claimants not yet born) requires division into homogeneous subclasses under Rule 
23(c)(4)(B), with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of 
counsel.”). But see Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 
2012) (rejecting a collateral attack challenging a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund 
class action settlement approved by the district court in 1999 in the breast implant 
multidistrict litigation notwithstanding the fact that subclasses were not created for 
present and future claimants, and interpreting Amchem and Ortiz to merely call for 
“some type of adequate structural protection [of adequate representation], which 
would include, but may not necessarily require, formally designated subclasses”). 




by drafting class definitions to encompass only individuals that have 
suffered some form of manifest injury. 
The more influential aspects of Amchem for present purposes are 
the Supreme Court’s recognition that “[t]he Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation” and the Court’s 
associated discussion of the lack of class cohesion in personal injury 
cases.40 In this regard, the Supreme Court began by identifying 
relevant causation circumstances that would be unique for each 
putative class member: 
Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing 
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and 
over different periods. Some class members suffer no physical 
injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while 
others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from 
mesothelioma . . . . Each has a different history of cigarette 
smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry.41 
In light of those individualized circumstances, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the district court’s “certification [of the putative 
class] cannot be upheld, for it rests on a conception of Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement irreconcilable with the Rule’s 
design.”42 
Although Amchem dealt specifically with a putative settlement 
class, the Supreme Court’s reasoning has been followed by a long 
line of decisions refusing to certify personal injury litigation classes 
in a variety of factual scenarios. For example, in pharmaceutical and 
medical device litigation, individualized issues such as the plaintiffs’ 
prior medical histories, the substance of interactions between 
plaintiffs and their doctors, the doctors’ own reasons for prescribing 
the drug or device at issue, and the content of the warnings that 
accompanied the drug or device at different points in time will 
                                                                                                             
 40. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. 
 41. Id. at 624 (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626). See also In re Asbestos 
Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 976 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that a “global class of 
asbestos claimants” likely would not satisfy Rule 23 “due to the huge number of 
individuals and their varying medical expenses, smoking histories, and family 
situations”). 
 42. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625. In Ortiz, the Supreme Court reiterated that “the 
determination whether ‘proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication’ must focus on ‘questions that preexist any settlement.’” Ortiz, 527 
U.S. at 858 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622–23). See also RICHARD A. 
NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 88 (2007) (“The Amchem 
Court chided the district judge for concluding that the proposed class was cohesive 
in the broad sense that all of its members, of course, would prefer to maximize the 
overall settlement pot.”). 




preclude class certification.43 Similarly, in litigation involving other 
types of products, individualized issues such as the plaintiffs’ prior 
medical histories, the details regarding each plaintiff’s exposure 
circumstance and relevant knowledge, and the nature of the 
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries have been cited as roadblocks to class 
certification.44 The same is true in litigation involving 
environmental exposure to harmful substances, where individualized 
issues such as the location and duration of the plaintiffs’ exposures, 
the plaintiffs’ susceptibilities to illness, and the nature of the 
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries will defeat class certification.45 
All of these individualized issues bear on the question of specific 
causation—namely, whether the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were in 
fact caused by the drug, device, product, or exposure at issue. 
Indeed, in mass tort personal injury litigation, “proof of wrongful 
conduct on the part of the defendant tends not to establish liability 
for compensatory damages . . . [because] further questions remain as 
to the existence of specific causation.”46 As a result, regardless of 
                                                                                                             
 43. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080–82 (6th Cir. 
1996); In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 
854 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 396 nn.7–
8 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 461 (E.D. La. 
2006); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 65–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In 
re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 625, 631–32 (W.D. 
Wash. 2002). 
 44. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625; Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 
734, 743 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The class members were exposed to nicotine 
through different products, for different amounts of time, and over different time 
periods. Each class member’s knowledge about the effects of smoking differs, and 
each plaintiff began smoking for different reasons.”); McBride v. Galaxy Carpet 
Mills, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (denying certification to putative 
class of plaintiffs alleging personal injuries caused by the chemical composition of 
carpet manufactured by the defendants). 
 45. See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 602 (5th 
Cir. 2006) (noting that class certification was inappropriate in an exposure case 
because each plaintiff’s claim “will be highly individualized with respect to 
proximate causation, including individual issues of exposure, susceptibility to 
illness, and types of physical injuries”); In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1873, 2008 WL 5423488, at *12 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2008) 
(recognizing that “there are significant and notable variations among the Plaintiffs 
that affect whether, and the extent to which, any plaintiff was exposed to 
formaldehyde and experienced health effects resulting from that exposure”); Rink 
v. Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648, 651–52 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (refusing to certify 
putative class of plaintiffs alleging injuries from exposure to chemical sprayed as 
part of a statewide medfly eradication program because “the circumstances of each 
individual’s exposure, the individual’s past and current medical history, and the 
individual’s failure to mitigate” defeated a finding of predominance). 
 46. Nagareda, supra note 5, at 1134. See also Allison v. Citgo Petroleum 
Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[A]s claims for individually based 
money damages begin to predominate, the presumption of cohesiveness decreases 




the factual context, courts today almost universally recognize that 
the lack of class cohesion precludes certification of personal injury 
litigation classes.47 
2. Choice-of-Law Complexities 
In recent years, choice-of-law complexities have also frustrated 
classwide treatment of state law personal injury claims.48 Before a 
putative litigation class that is defined to include class members 
from different states can be certified, the trial court must engage in a 
choice-of-law analysis to determine whether multiple states’ laws 
must be applied to the class members’ claims.49 This choice-of-law 
                                                                                                             
 
while the need for enhanced procedural safeguards to protect the individual rights 
of class members increases.”). 
 47. The most notable exception to this trend occurred in Mullen v. Treasure 
Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs in Mullen were 
former employees of a floating casino and brought a class action against the casino 
alleging respiratory injuries (including asthma and bronchitis) as a result of the 
casino’s allegedly defective air conditioning and ventilation system (which led to 
“extremely smoky conditions” in the casino). The district court crafted a trial plan 
that consisted of a Phase One class trial on common issues to be followed by 
waves of individual Phase Two trials on individual issues of causation and 
damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s certification of a “common issues” litigation class pursuant to Rule 
23(b)(3) and held that the predominance requirement was satisfied because the 
class members were “symptomatic by definition and claim[ed] injury from the 
same defective ventilation system over the same general period of time.” Id. at 
626–27. The Fifth Circuit also noted that the common issues in the case, notably 
negligence and seaworthiness of the floating casino, were the most “pivotal.” Id. 
 48. See generally Grabill, supra note 5, at 309–11. As I have previously 
argued, this development “should not be viewed as unnecessarily creating 
duplicative litigation, but rather as ensuring that the judicial system enjoys the 
benefits of parallel litigation of complex cases while respecting basic notions of 
federalism.” Id. at 319. Nevertheless, others continue to search for “fixes” to this 
purported choice-of-law “problem.” See Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A 
Solution to the Choice of Law Problem of Differing State Laws in Class Actions: 
Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 375 (2011) (arguing that “applying the 
average of the differing state laws can overcome [the] choice of law impediment 
to using class actions without compromising the functioning of civil liability in 
any significant way”); Linda Siberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National 
Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2022–34 (2008) (advocating the adoption 
of an “independent federal choice of law rule”). 
 49. See, e.g., Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 311–14 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The 
district court is required to know which law will apply before it makes its 
predominance determination [under Rule 23(b)(3)].”); Castano, 84 F.3d at 741–43 
(“[V]ariations in state law [must not] swamp any common issues and defeat 
predominance.”). Federal courts sitting in diversity must generally apply the 
choice-of-law rules of the forum state. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 




inquiry is part of the “rigorous analysis” that trial courts must 
conduct when determining whether to certify a putative class 
action.50 
More often than not, in putative personal injury class actions, the 
relevant choice-of-law rules will require that the putative class 
members’ claims be governed by their home states’ laws. For 
example, “the majority of states have adopted the choice-of-law 
rules set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,”51 
which provide that “[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with 
respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state 
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant 
relationship to the occurrence and the parties.”52 Several states, 
however, “still apply the lex loci delicti principle, which was 
presented in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, and 
generally requires courts to apply the law of ‘the state where the last 
event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes 
place.’”53 But regardless of which choice-of-law regime applies, 
courts typically conclude that a plaintiff’s personal injury claims 
must be governed by his or her home state’s law.54 This result has 
                                                                                                             
 
313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). In cases transferred into a multidistrict litigation 
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, however, the transferee court must apply 
the choice-of-law rules of the transferor forum. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 
U.S. 516, 523–25 (1990). 
 50. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). See also 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (reaffirming that 
trial courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” before certifying class actions, even 
if that analysis “overlap[s] with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim”). 
Courts must also ensure that their choice of law in putative class actions does not 
violate “the constitutional limitations on choice of law mandated by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
of Article IV, § 1.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985). In 
that regard, “for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally 
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is 
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)). 
 51. Grabill, supra note 5, at 302. 
 52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971). 
 53. Grabill, supra note 5, at 303 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 377 (1934)). 
 54. For example, in Amchem, the Third Circuit noted that “[v]ariations in 
state law magnify” the individual factual differences among plaintiffs. Georgine v. 
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). See also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1301 (7th Cir. 1995) (implicitly recognizing that plaintiffs’ 
claims would be governed by their home state law and noting that “[t]he voices of 
the quasi-sovereigns that are the states of the United States sing negligence with . . . 




previously been described as creating a “complexity of application” 
that will often frustrate a putative class’s ability to satisfy Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements.55 
3. Discomfort with All-or-Nothing Adversarial Proceedings 
In addition to the lack of cohesion and choice-of-law issues 
discussed above, some courts have also expressed a general 
discomfort with allowing hundreds or thousands of mass tort claims 
to be resolved by one trial. That discomfort often manifests itself in 
a finding that a proposed class action is not “superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”56 The two leading cases expressing this view are In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.57 and Castano v. American Tobacco 
Co.58 from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Fifth 
Circuits, respectively. 
Rhone-Poulenc involved a putative class of hemophiliacs 
allegedly infected by the AIDS virus as a result of using tainted 
blood solids manufactured by the defendants.59 Notably, the district 
court did not certify the entire case as a class action but instead 
certified the case pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) “‘as a class action with 
respect to particular issues.’”60 As understood by the Seventh 
Circuit, the district court envisioned “the rendition by a jury of a 
special verdict that would answer a number of questions bearing, 
                                                                                                             
 
different pitch[es]”); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 458 (E.D. La. 
2006) (holding that New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules required that “the substantive 
law of each plaintiff’s home jurisdiction must be applied to his or her respective 
claims”); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 67–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(noting that the court “likely would be obliged to apply the laws of all fifty states” 
to the plaintiffs’ personal injury claims). 
 55. See Grabill, supra note 5, at 306–08; see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
because the class members’ claims “must be adjudicated under the law of so many 
jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is not manageable”). Of course, there may 
be situations where the competing state laws are not in conflict, and, in those 
situations, the mere need to apply multiple states’ laws may not categorically 
prevent class certification. See Grabill, supra note 5, at 312–13 (collecting 
authorities). 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 57. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 58. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 59. In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294–95. 
 60. Id. at 1297 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A)). The court noted that 
“differences in the date of infection alone of the thousands of potential class 
members would make [certification of the entire case under Rule 23(b)(3)] 
infeasible.” Id. at 1296–97. 




perhaps decisively, on whether the defendants [were] negligent.”61 
Assuming the issues-class trial resulted in a finding of negligence, 
“individual members of the class would then file individual tort suits 
in state and federal district courts around the nation and would use 
the special verdict, in conjunction with the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, to block relitigation of the issue of negligence.”62 The 
defendants challenged the issues-class certification by seeking a writ 
of mandamus from the Seventh Circuit. 
Notwithstanding the court’s recognition that “mandamus is 
issued only in extraordinary cases,”63 the Seventh Circuit granted 
the defendants’ petition and decertified the issues class.64 The court 
was particularly concerned that the defendants would be “under 
intense pressure to settle” as a result of the certification order.65 At 
the time of the decision, approximately 300 similar lawsuits had 
been filed involving some 400 plaintiffs.66 There had also been 13 
individual trials, and the defendants had won 12 of them.67 
Extrapolating from these statistics, the court estimated that, but for 
the certification order, the defendants might be facing liability in 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id. at 1297. 
 62. Id. This is essentially the same approach being used in the so-called 
“Engle progeny” cases percolating through the Florida state courts in which 
plaintiffs allege smoking-related injuries. In Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 
2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), the Florida Supreme Court blessed “certain common liability 
findings” from a class-wide trial and held that those findings must be given “res 
judicata effect” in subsequent actions filed by individual class members. Id. at 
1254. See also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) 
(clarifying the scope of the preclusive effect of the Engle findings). 
 63. In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294. 
 64. Id. at 1297 (“With all due respect for the district judge’s commendable 
desire to experiment with an innovative procedure for streamlining the 
adjudication of this ‘mass tort,’ we believe that his plan so far exceeds the 
permissible bounds of discretion in the management of federal litigation as to 
compel us to intervene and order decertification.”). 
 65. Id. at 1298. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1998) 
(“An order granting certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than 
incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous 
liability.”). Several recent decisions have reiterated the view that the certification 
of a litigation class can place significant pressure on defendants to settle. See 
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1206 
(2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Certification of the class is often, if not usually, the 
prelude to a substantial settlement by the defendant because the costs and risks of 
litigating further are so high.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740, 1752 (2011) (recognizing that class actions can entail a “risk of ‘in terrorem’ 
settlements”); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1007 (7th Cir. 
2012) (noting that having “to face all [class members] in a single trial . . . could 
produce a monstrous judgment” and that “[i]t is such threats of ruin that force 
most defendants in class action suits to settle if a class is certified”). 
 66. In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296. 
 67. Id. at 1298. 




about 25 cases that could total up to $125 million.68 But as a result 
of the certification of an issues class and based on the assumption 
that claims by 5,000 of the potential class members were not yet 
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations—likely a 
conservative estimate in light of the class action tolling doctrine—
the court suggested that the defendants might “easily be facing $25 
billion in potential liability (conceivably more), and with it 
bankruptcy.”69 The court balked at the implications of such an all-
or-nothing proposition and held that “it is not a waste of judicial 
resources to conduct more than one trial, before more than six 
jurors, to determine whether a major segment of the international 
pharmaceutical industry is to follow the asbestos manufacturers into 
Chapter 11.”70 
A little more than one year after the Seventh Circuit issued its 
decision in Rhone-Poulenc, a similarly ambitious issues-class 
certification met the same fate in the Fifth Circuit for essentially 
identical reasons. Castano involved a putative class of all nicotine-
dependent persons in the United States who purchased and smoked 
cigarettes manufactured by the defendants since 1943.71 The 
putative Rule 23(b)(3) class sought a variety of relief, including 
compensatory and punitive damages “for the injury of nicotine 
addiction.”72 The district court certified an issues class pursuant to 
Rule 23(c)(4) for the issues of “core liability” and punitive 
damages.73 Much like the district court in Rhone-Poulenc, the 
district court in Castano contemplated an issues-class trial on certain 
questions of liability to be followed by individualized damages 
proceedings, assuming the jury returned a pro-plaintiff verdict in the 
initial issues-class trial.74 
This all-or-nothing approach on questions of liability caused the 
Fifth Circuit serious concern. The court explained its discomfort by 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1300. The Seventh Circuit was also concerned about the district 
court’s plan to instruct the issues-class jury with “a kind of Esperanto instruction, 
merging the negligence standards of the 50 states and the District of Columbia,” 
id., and the Seventh Amendment implications of the proposed bifurcation of 
liability issues between different juries, id. at 1302–04. 
 71. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 72. Id. The plaintiffs’ theory of liability was that “defendants fraudulently 
failed to inform consumers that nicotine is addictive and manipulated the level of 
nicotine in cigarettes to sustain their addictive nature.” Id. 
 73. Id. at 739. The district court defined “core liability” issues as “‘common 
factual issues [of] whether defendants knew cigarette smoking was addictive, 
failed to inform cigarette smokers of such, and took actions to addict cigarette 
smokers.’” Id. (quoting the district court). 
 74. Id. at 738. 




noting that “class certification creates insurmountable pressure on 
defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not” because 
“[t]he risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a 
risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low.”75 
Consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s view, the Fifth Circuit held 
that “[t]he collective wisdom of individual juries is necessary before 
this court commits the fate of an entire industry or, indeed, the fate 
of a class of millions, to a single jury.”76 
Thus, whether resulting from the lack of class cohesion, the 
existence of choice-of-law complexities, or judicial discomfort with 
all-or-nothing trials, personal injury claims are no longer certified as 
litigation classes. As Professor Nagareda explained, these 
“constraints on class certification [have been] elaborated over 
decades of real-world experience [and] are not hypertechnical 
bugaboos.”77 
Rather, they stem ultimately from a well-taken notion of 
“preclusive symmetry”—an insistence that the plaintiff class 
ought not to be positioned to wield the bargaining leverage 
of a class-wide trial without, at the same time, affording to 
the defendant the assurance of a commensurately binding 
victory were the defendant, rather than the plaintiff class, to 
prevail on the merits.78 
In both Rhone-Poulenc and Castano, the courts expressed a 
preference for diversified decisionmaking by multiple juries in mass 
tort litigation.79 For example, given that personal injury claims are 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. at 746. 
 76. Id. at 752. 
 77. Nagareda, supra note 5, at 1113. 
 78. Id. Professor Nagareda further elaborated on this concept as follows: 
The reason why material differences in the content of applicable 
substantive law or in the factual circumstances of class members matter 
to class certification as a format for litigation . . . stems from the need, 
absent settlement, to generate a judgment that will be issue preclusive on 
the parties plus those capable of being bound as nonparties, like absent 
class members. And issue preclusion turns upon actual litigation and 
determination of the same legal or factual issue across the proceeding 
said to yield such preclusive effect and the subsequent action to be 
precluded. Material differences matter in practical terms because they 
threaten to disable a [class-wide] trial from doing the essential thing that 
it is supposed to do: resolve the disputed issues conclusively so as not to 
allow the losing side to relitigate the issue later. 
Id. at 1139 (footnotes omitted). 
 79. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995); 
Castano, 84 F.3d at 752. I have previously argued that the “diversified 
decisionmaking by legal communities around the country” that results from such 
“parallel litigation” is not only consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s 




rarely small-value or negative-value claims that would be 
outweighed by the expense of litigation, the Seventh Circuit thought 
it was “entirely feasible to allow a final, authoritative determination 
of [the defendants’] liability for the colossal misfortune that has 
befallen the hemophiliac population to emerge from a decentralized 
process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different 
standards of liability, in different jurisdictions.”80 Perhaps it should 
not be surprising then that MDL and bellwether trials have emerged 
to fill the procedural void left by the demise of personal injury 
litigation classes.81 
B. Contemporary Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation 
In 1968, only two years after the extensive class action 
amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Congress enacted the MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407.82 Section 
1407 allows related lawsuits pending in federal courts across the 
country to be transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation (JPML) to one judge for “coordinated or consolidated 
pretrial proceedings.”83 With the move away from personal injury 
class actions, MDL consolidation is increasingly being relied upon 
to aggregate the tens, hundreds, or thousands of related claims that 
flood into the federal courts every time a discrete accident or event, 
harmful substance or condition, or defective drug, device, or product 
                                                                                                             
 
“fundamental principle of dual sovereignty” but will also “ultimately lead to better 
law.” Grabill, supra note 5, at 324. 
 80. In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299. The Fifth Circuit similarly noted 
that the claims of the putative class members were not “negative-value” suits. 
Castano, 84 F.3d at 748 (recounting plaintiffs’ counsel’s promise to “inundate the 
courts with individual claims if class certification is denied”). 
 81. See infra Part II.B.1. By combining “individual actions with some manner 
of centralizing mechanism,” the emerging trends of multidistrict litigation and 
bellwether trials are consistent with Professor Nagareda’s prescription for 
“hybridization” in situations of “embedded aggregation” (i.e., “ostensibly 
individual litigation” that has an “aggregate dimension”). Nagareda, supra note 5, 
at 1108–14. 
 82. Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1407). 
 83. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). See generally U.S. JUD. PANEL ON 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov (last visited Dec. 5, 2013). 
Section 1407 was enacted largely in response to the difficulties created by two 
waves of antitrust litigation in the 1950s and 1960s (the former involving the 
motion picture industry and the latter electrical equipment manufacturers). See 
Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a 
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 2245, 2258–66 (2008). 




is suspected of causing similar injuries to multiple people.84 And 
although state court cases are not subject to federal MDL transfer, it 
is increasingly common for MDL transferee courts to cooperate and 
coordinate with state courts handling similar claims.85 
The JPML consists of seven sitting federal judges designated by 
the Chief Justice of the United States, and it holds public hearings 
once every other month around the country to determine whether 
MDL proceedings should be created for various collections of 
similar claims.86 To carry out its statutory function, the JPML 
engages in a two-step process when it is notified of potentially 
related lawsuits. The JPML first “considers whether common 
questions of fact among several pending civil actions exist such that 
centralization of those actions in a single district will further the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and 
efficient conduct of the actions.”87 If the JPML decides to create an 
MDL proceeding, it then “considers which federal district and judge 
are best situated to handle the transferred matters.”88 
                                                                                                             
 84. See, e.g., Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass 
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 962 (2012) (“[R]ecent years have 
seen a rise in the use of coordinated multidistrict litigation to aggregate mass tort 
claims.”). 
 85. See In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
2418, 2013 WL 565971, at *2 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 12, 2013) (identifying related state 
court litigation and noting that the creation of a federal MDL “likely will facilitate 
coordination among all courts with Plavix cases, simply because there will now be 
only one federal judge handling most or all federal Plavix litigation”). See 
generally Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and 
State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867 (2000). For 
example, Professor McGovern was appointed as Special Master in the multidistrict 
litigation arising from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and tasked with 
assisting the transferee court, the parties, and counsel “in coordinating . . . with 
other matters related to MDL-2179, including, but not limited to, matters in other 
federal courts [and] matters in state courts.” See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. 
La. Oct. 7, 2010) (order appointing Professor McGovern as Special Master), 
available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/10072010Order(App 
ointSpecial Master).pdf. To achieve even greater aggregation of related claims and 
reduce the need for such cross-jurisdictional cooperation and informal 
coordination, Judge Weinstein has argued that “[i]t may be useful for Congress to 
consider expanding the Class Action Fairness Act from class actions to at least 
some national MDL, non-Rule 23, aggregate actions” because “[m]uch the same 
concerns which animated CAFA’s preference for a single, federal forum [for class 
actions] apply to national MDL aggregate actions.” In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d). 
 87. Heyburn, supra note 7, at 2228. 
 88. Id. 




1. Pretrial Management Techniques 
MDL consolidation of related lawsuits does not merge the suits 
into one massive case. Rather, MDL consolidation merely brings 
related lawsuits before one judge so that they can be organized and 
managed collectively to avoid the need to conduct duplicative 
discovery. Nevertheless, the transferee court enjoys “broad” 
authority that “necessarily encompasses issuing pretrial orders, 
resolving pretrial motions (including discovery motions, motions to 
amend, motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and 
motions for class certification), and attempting to facilitate 
settlement.”89 
Following the creation of an MDL, the transferee court will 
typically appoint plaintiffs’ and defendants’ liaison counsel to 
manage the litigation and be the primary points of contact for the 
court.90 In order to focus its attention on key legal issues presented 
in the litigation, one of the first tasks that the transferee court may 
assign to plaintiffs’ liaison counsel is to review the claims and 
theories of liability set forth in the various individual cases that 
comprise the MDL and compile one or more master complaints to 
serve as the target for consolidated Rule 12 motion practice.91 
For example, shortly after a multidistrict litigation proceeding 
was created for the claims stemming from the BP Deepwater 
                                                                                                             
 89. Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 7, at 2328. 
 90. See id. at 2338 n.74 (explaining that liaison counsel “essentially serve as 
the communication conduit between the transferee court and the thousands of 
lawyers that can often be involved in any given MDL”); see also In re Oil Spill by 
the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL 
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (Pretrial Order No. 1) para. 16, available at 
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/PTO1.pdf (discussing the duties of 
liaison counsel and providing that such counsel “shall be authorized to receive 
orders and notices from the Court on behalf of all parties within their liaison group 
and shall be responsible for the preparation and transmittal of copies of such 
orders and notices to the parties in their liaison group and perform other tasks 
determined by the Court”). 
 91. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 453 (E.D. La. 2006) 
(noting that “[m]aster complaints help the Court and the parties focus on common 
issues in an efficient and effective manner”); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., 
208 F.R.D. 133, 141 (E.D. La. 2002) (“Master complaints are often used in 
complex litigation, although they are not specifically mentioned in either the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or in any federal statute.”). But see In re 
Nuvaring Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-MD-1964, 2009 WL 2425391, at *2 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 6, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss master consolidated complaint 
because that complaint was simply an “administrative tool to place in one 
document all of the claims at issue in this litigation” and the court did not 
contemplate Rule 12 motion practice “against the master complaint”). 




Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010,92 the transferee 
court organized the claims into various “pleading bundles” for 
purposes of “filing of complaints, answers and any Rule 12 
motions.”93 The massive oil spill arose “from the April 20, 2010 
explosion, fire, and sinking of the DEEPWATER HORIZON 
mobile offshore drilling unit . . . which resulted in the release of 
millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico before it was 
finally capped approximately three months later.”94 Accordingly, the 
pleading bundles were based on the types of claims being asserted 
and/or the identity of the parties, for example: 
 • Bundle A—personal injury and wrongful death claims 
involving individuals on the rig at the time of the explosion; • Bundle B1—non-governmental economic loss and property 
damage claims; • Bundle B2—RICO claims; • Bundle B3—claims by clean-up workers for personal 
injuries or medical monitoring; • Bundle B4—claims against vessels that responded to the 
rig’s distress call; • Bundle C—public damage claims by governmental entities; • Bundle D1—claims against private parties seeking 
injunctive relief; and • Bundle D2—claims against governmental parties 
challenging regulatory actions.95 
 
In the pretrial order that created these bundles, the transferee 
court also directed plaintiffs’ liaison counsel to file master 
complaints in most bundles and established a schedule for Rule 12 
motions.96 Approximately one year later, the transferee court had 
resolved the Rule 12 motions that challenged the various master 
complaints and was preparing to conduct its first trial on the claims 
                                                                                                             
 92. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (creating MDL 
2179). 
 93. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010) (Pretrial Order 
No. 11) para. III, available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders 
/PTO11.pdf. 
 94. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 
on Apr. 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 95. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 
on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010) (Pretrial Order No. 11) 
para. III, available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/PTO11.pdf. 
 96. Id. at paras. III–IV. 




that remained.97 On the eve of that trial, however, two putative class 
action settlements were announced that held the promise of 
resolving many of the private-party claims in the litigation.98 The 
transferee court subsequently certified both settlement classes and 
gave final approval to both settlement agreements.99 
Following an initial round of motion practice focused on key 
legal issues and to the extent that plaintiffs’ claims survive such 
threshold scrutiny, MDL transferee courts are increasingly utilizing 
bellwether trial plans, whereby several individual cases are selected 
to proceed through full discovery and trial.100 Although the results 
                                                                                                             
 97. See In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (granting in part and denying in 
part motions to dismiss the Bundle B1 master complaint); In re Oil Spill by the Oil 
Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 792 F. Supp. 2d 
926 (E.D. La. 2011) (granting motions to dismiss the Bundle D1 master 
complaint), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 704 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Oil 
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 
802 F. Supp. 2d 725 (E.D. La. 2011) (granting motions to dismiss the Bundle B2 
master complaint); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf 
of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 4575696 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 
2011) (granting in part and denying in part motions to dismiss the Bundle B3 
master complaint); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf 
of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 4829905 (E.D. La. Oct. 12, 
2011) (granting joint motion to dismiss the Bundle B4 cases), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 
355 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the 
Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 835 F. Supp. 2d 175 (E.D. La. 2011) (granting in 
part and denying in part motions to dismiss certain Bundle C cases). 
 98. See Press Release, BP, BP Announces Settlement with PSC, Subject to 
Final Written Agreement, to Resolve Economic Loss and Medical Claims from 
Deepwater Horizon Accident and Oil Spill (Mar. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7073667. 
 99. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) (certifying a 
settlement class and granting final approval to the so-called Economic and 
Property Damages Settlement Agreement); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 
2013 WL 144042 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2013) (certifying a settlement class and 
granting final approval to the so-called Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement 
Agreement).  As this Article goes to press, various appeals are pending in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit regarding the transferee court’s certification 
and approval of both settlement classes. 
 100. See Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 7, at 2325 (“A typical 
bellwether case often begins as no more than an individual lawsuit that proceeds 
through pretrial discovery and on to trial in the usual binary fashion: one plaintiff 
versus one defendant. Such a case may take on ‘bellwether’ qualities, however, 
when it is selected for trial because it involves facts, claims, or defenses that are 
similar to the facts, claims, and defenses presented in a wider group of related 
cases.”); see also Ashley Post, Yamaha and Merck Win High-Profile Bellwether 
Trials, INSIDECOUNSEL (Feb. 1, 2012) (discussing the increasing use of bellwether 
trials), available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/02/01/yamaha-and-
merck-win-high-profile-bellwether-trial. Of course, “a transferee court cannot try 




of those trials are not binding on other individual plaintiffs within 
the MDL, the “ultimate purpose of holding bellwether trials” is to 
“provide meaningful information and experience to everyone 
involved in the litigation[].”101 Indeed, “bellwether trials can 
precipitate and inform settlement negotiations by indicating future 
trends, that is, by providing guidance on how similar claims may 
fare before subsequent juries.”102 
After several years of intensive discovery, bellwether trials, and 
authoritative rulings on key legal issues during which time the 
applicable statutes of limitations should be running against 
individuals who have not yet come forward to assert claims, the 
statutory role of an MDL transferee court will often be largely 
complete. In fact, § 1407 “obligates the [JPML] to remand any 
pending case to its originating court when . . . pretrial proceedings 
have run their course.”103 That said, “[f]ew cases are remanded for 
trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the transferee court.”104  
Nevertheless, it is the threat of remand—and the associated potential 
chaos of dispersed litigation in federal courts across the country—
that often supplies the necessary impetus for the initiation of 
settlement negotiations within the MDL context. 
2. Modern Methods for Achieving Global Resolution 
As I have previously described, “mass tort litigation is 
increasingly resolved through non-class aggregate settlements” 
known as “private mass tort settlements.”105 Notwithstanding this 
emerging trend, however, class action settlements are still 
occasionally used to settle mass tort litigation as well. It is important 
to understand both settlement approaches to appreciate the harmful 
effects that the class action tolling doctrine can have on efforts to 
resolve contemporary mass tort litigation and how those effects can 
be alleviated by MDL transferee courts. 
                                                                                                             
 
cases transferred to it by the [JPML], unless the litigants consent to trial before the 
transferee court.” Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 7, at 2354 (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & 
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)). 
 101. Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 7, at 2332. 
 102. Id. at 2338. 
 103. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 34. 
 104. Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151 (D. 
Mass. 2006). 
 105. Grabill, supra note 10, at 123. Unlike proposed class action settlements, 
private mass tort settlements are not subject to judicial review. Id. at 162–69. 




a. Private Mass Tort Settlements 
Private mass tort settlements are non-class aggregate settlements 
to which individual plaintiffs must affirmatively opt in.106 The two 
most prominent examples of private mass tort settlements are the 
2007 settlement of the Vioxx pharmaceutical MDL and the 2010 
settlement of the World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation.107 
For present purposes, the key distinguishing feature of private 
mass tort settlements is that the settlement offer is made only to 
current or eligible plaintiffs that have come forward in some fashion 
to assert a claim by a negotiated deadline that usually either predates 
or coincides with the date of the settlement announcement.108 Thus, 
potential plaintiffs that have not identified themselves as of the 
relevant cutoff date usually “miss the boat” in terms of being able to 
participate in private mass tort settlements. This may, of course, be 
unfortunate for those individuals, but it can have broader 
consequences. As further discussed in Part III.C below, to the extent 
that such potential plaintiffs have been sitting on the sideline 
because their individual home states’ statutes of limitations have 
been tolled by the class action tolling doctrine, the defendant(s)—
and the judiciary for that matter—will face the risk of a post-
settlement wave of timely new claims. And depending on the 
magnitude of that risk, it is even possible that the defendant(s) may 
decide not to attempt a global settlement in the first place. 
b. Class Action Settlements 
As the Supreme Court explained in Amchem, a “settlement 
class” is one that is “not intended to be litigated.”109 Accordingly, 
“[s]ettlement is relevant to class certification,” and a court presented 
with a request for certification of a settlement class “need not 
inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable 
                                                                                                             
 106. Id. at 157–58. 
 107. Id. at 142–53. 
 108. Id. at 156–57. There are at least four other distinctive features of private 
mass tort settlements: 
(1) private mass tort settlements begin as a global settlement offer set 
forth in a contract between plaintiffs’ liaison counsel and the 
defendant(s); . . . [(2)] a requisite percentage of eligible plaintiffs must 
individually opt in for the deal to become effective, but plaintiffs who 
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awards are based on detailed “points” matrices administered by claims 
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Id. at 154. 
 109. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601 (1997). 




management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no 
trial.”110 Moreover, “although variations in state laws applicable to 
the claims of members of a putative multistate or nationwide 
litigation class ordinarily preclude class certification, courts have 
consistently held that such variations are no impediment to 
certification of a class for settlement purposes only.”111 In short, 
although “[t]he same analytical rigor is required for litigation and 
settlement certification . . . some inquiries essential to litigation class 
certification are no longer problematic in the settlement context.”112 
Notwithstanding that the law on settlement classes is still 
“evolving” and that “class settlement in mass tort cases (especially 
personal injury claims) remains problematic,”113 the relaxation of 
certain aspects of the Rule 23 analysis for settlement classes has 
allowed several prominent mass tort cases to be settled as class 
actions, including the Agent Orange,114 Breast Implants,115 and Fen-
                                                                                                             
 110. Id. at 621. That said, “other specifications” of Rule 23, particularly those 
“designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class 
definitions,” “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement 
context” because “a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the 
opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the 
proceedings as they unfold.” Id. 
 111. 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:3 (8th 
ed. 2011) (collecting authorities). See also Varacallo v. Massachusetts Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 232 (D.N.J. 2005) (“Here, the case is not being certified 
for litigation purposes, thus . . . predominance is not defeated by any differences in 
the various laws of the fifty states.”). 
 112. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 335 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., 
concurring). 
 113. Id. at 333–34 (Scirica, J., concurring). Perhaps the most important open 
question is the degree to which the Supreme Court’s recent strengthening of Rule 
23’s commonality requirement in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011), will apply in the settlement class context. See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. 
Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that “the commonality test is no 
longer met when the proposed class merely establishes that ‘there is at least one 
issue whose resolution will affect all or a significant number of the putative class 
members,’” but rather it now requires that all of the class members’ claims 
“depend on a common issue of law or fact whose resolution ‘will resolve an issue 
that is central to the validity of each one of the [class member’s] claims in one 
stroke’” (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551)). 
 114. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 163–67 (2d Cir. 
1987) (affirming Judge Weinstein’s decision to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action 
given the centrality of the military contractor defense, notwithstanding the fact that 
the issue of specific causation was “highly individualistic, and depend[ed] upon 
the characteristics of individual plaintiffs (e.g. state of health, lifestyle) and the 
nature of their exposure” and nevertheless recognizing that the Agent Orange 
litigation “justifies the prevalent skepticism over the usefulness of class actions in 
so-called mass tort cases”). 
 115. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 926, 1994 
WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class 




Phen116 litigations. That relaxation may have also incentivized the 
recent use of the class action device to settle the personal injury and 
medical monitoring claims of individuals who were involved in 
and/or exposed to the clean-up operations after the BP Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill.117 
III. THE PESKY PERSISTENCE OF THE CLASS ACTION TOLLING 
DOCTRINE 
Despite the move away from personal injury litigation classes 
and toward multidistrict litigation, bellwether trials, and private 
mass tort settlements, the class action tolling doctrine is alive and 
well in various jurisdictions across the country. The U.S. Supreme 
Court first blessed the class action tolling doctrine in the antitrust 
context almost 40 years ago,118 and since then the doctrine has 
                                                                                                             
 
and approving a $4.25 billion class action settlement encompassing all people who 
received implants from the settling defendants prior to June 1, 1993). The original 
class action settlement in the Breast Implants litigation unraveled as a result of 
unexpectedly large numbers of claimants applying to the settlement fund and Dow 
Corning’s subsequent bankruptcy filing. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 
482, 486 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 116. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1203, 99–20593, 2000 WL 
1222042, at *41–42 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (certifying a nationwide settlement 
class pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) because “use of the diet drugs 
spanned a finite and relatively short period of time” and the drugs caused “a 
common injury type to heart valves”). 
 117. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2013 WL 144042 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 
2013) (certifying a settlement class and granting final approval to the so-called 
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement). It is worth noting here that 
the order granting preliminary approval to the Medical Benefits Class Action 
Settlement explicitly 
toll[ed] and stay[ed] the statutes of limitation applicable to any and all 
claims or causes of action for Released Claims that have been or could be 
asserted by or on behalf of any Medical Benefits Settlement Class 
Members unless and until they Opt Out of the Medical Benefits 
Settlement Class or the Medical Settlement Agreement is terminated 
pursuant to Section XIV [of the settlement agreement]. 
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 
20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012) (preliminary approval order) 
para. 32, available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/05022012 
Order (MedicalSettlement).pdf. Although the class action tolling doctrine likely 
rendered this provision in the preliminary approval order unnecessary, it is still 
instructive because even if the transferee court had cut off class action tolling at 
the inception of the MDL as proposed in this Article, some minimal period of 
tolling may nevertheless be appropriate upon preliminary approval of a class 
action settlement. 
 118. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 




expanded and been adopted by a variety of state courts as a matter of 
state law. Indeed, although several courts have called into question 
the continued application of the class action tolling doctrine in mass 
tort litigation,119 the fact is that the filing of a putative personal 
injury class action will still toll the applicable statutes of limitations 
for potential personal injury plaintiffs in many jurisdictions and 
thereby increase the amount of time such potential plaintiffs have to 
come forward and assert their claims.120 
A. American Pipe and Its Progeny 
Prior to Rule 23’s amendment in 1966, a so-called “spurious” 
class action could be maintained when “the character of the right 
sought to be enforced for or against the class [was] . . . several, and 
there [was] a common question of law or fact affecting the several 
rights and a common relief [was] sought.”121 Unlike modern Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions, spurious class actions were opt-in class 
actions, such that “putative members of the class who chose not to 
                                                                                                             
 119. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 1348, 2005 WL 26867, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005) (noting that the “wisdom of adopting the American 
Pipe rule in mass tort cases is, to say the least, highly debatable”); Bell v. Showa 
Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to “hold that the 
filing of a mass personal injury suit, in a federal court, in another state, with the 
variety of claims necessarily involved in such a case, entitled a plaintiff to a tolling 
of the limitations period such as in American Pipe”); Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 
P.2d 923, 937 (Cal. 1988) (stating that plaintiffs “would be ill advised to rely on 
the mere filing of a class action complaint to toll their individual statute of 
limitations”); see also, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 897, 
907 n.3 (E.D. La. 2007) (rejecting defendant’s request not to apply American Pipe 
tolling and instead holding that “until such a uniform rule prohibiting certification 
of personal injury class actions is announced, the Court will faithfully apply 
American Pipe”). 
 120. Of course, the plaintiff that seeks to rely on a previously filed putative 
class action for tolling purposes must fit within that putative class action’s class 
definition. See, e.g., Knollenberg v. Wyeth, No. 2:05-CV-2044, 2011 WL 
5358698 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 7, 2011) (refusing to toll the two-year statute of 
limitations on plaintiff’s claims because she fell outside the class definition set 
forth in the previously filed putative class action). It is also worth noting that “a 
majority of the federal Courts of Appeals . . . have denied tolling in the successive 
class action context,” that is, when “absent class members . . . seek to press their 
claims in the context of a successive class action initiated by a new class 
representative.” Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule 
and Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 806–07 (2006). In other 
words, after certification is denied, putative members of a previously filed putative 
class action must generally come forward individually—not as part of a new 
putative class action—in order to enjoy the benefits of class action tolling. 
 121. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 545 (quoting the pre-amendment version of FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23). 




intervene or join as parties would not be bound by the judgment.”122 
As the Supreme Court explained, “A recurrent source of abuse 
under the former Rule lay in the potential that members of the 
claimed class could in some situations await developments in the 
trial or even final judgment on the merits in order to determine 
whether participation would be favorable to their interests.”123 When 
Rule 23 was amended in 1966, there existed a conflict among the 
federal courts of appeals concerning whether the filing of a putative 
spurious class action tolled the applicable statutes of limitations for 
putative class members—to be more precise, the tolling issue at that 
time was framed as “whether parties should be allowed to join or 
intervene as members of a ‘spurious’ class after the termination of 
[their own] limitation period, when the initial class action complaint 
had been filed before the applicable statute of limitations period had 
run.”124 
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the Supreme 
Court finally addressed this question but did so through the looking 
glass of the amended version of Rule 23.125 And, indeed, the 
Supreme Court viewed the revisions to Rule 23 as dispositive of the 
tolling issue: 
Whatever the merit in the conclusion that one seeking to join 
a class after the running of the statutory period asserts a 
“separate cause of action” which must individually meet the 
timeliness requirements, such a concept is simply 
inconsistent with Rule 23 as presently drafted. A federal 
class action is no longer “an invitation to joinder” but a truly 
representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, 
unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions.126 
Thus, the Court held that “the commencement of the original class 
suit tolls the running of the statute [of limitations] for all purported 
members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after 
the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status.”127 
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. at 547. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 549–50 nn.18–19 (collecting authorities). 
 125. For a detailed discussion of the factual background in American Pipe, see 
Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 21, at 538–41. 
 126. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550. The Supreme Court noted that the 1966 
amendments “were designed, in part, specifically to mend [the] perceived defect in 
the former Rule and to assure that members of the class would be identified before 
trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and judgments.” 
Id. at 547. 
 127. Id. at 553. Notably, the Supreme Court limited its holding to the unique 
posture of the case before it, namely “where class action status ha[d] been denied 
solely because of failure to demonstrate that ‘the class is so numerous that joinder 




Of course, in mass tort MDLs today, the question is not usually 
one of intervention but rather whether purported members of a 
putative class that is denied class action status should be allowed to 
subsequently file separate lawsuits if their individual limitations 
periods would have expired without the benefit of tolling. In 1983, 
the Supreme Court expanded upon American Pipe to shed light on 
this related issue (albeit not in the MDL context) in Crown, Cork & 
Seal Co. v. Parker.128 The American Pipe decision had concluded 
with broad language that could be read to apply beyond the context 
of intervention: “[T]he commencement of a class action suspends 
the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the 
class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to 
continue as a class action.”129 In Crown, Cork & Seal, the Court 
reaffirmed this language and held that once the applicable statutes of 
limitations have been tolled by the filing of a putative class action, 
they “remain[] tolled for all members of the putative class until class 
certification is denied. At that point, class members may choose to 
file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending 
action.”130 
                                                                                                             
 
of all members is impracticable’” but “common issues of law and fact respecting 
the underlying conspiracy” were nonetheless probable. Id. at 552–53 (quoting 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)). Today, those original limiting conditions have largely 
been forgotten. 
 128. 462 U.S. 345 (1983). As with the antitrust claim at issue in American 
Pipe, the racial discrimination claim at issue in Crown, Cork & Seal arose under 
federal law. For further details concerning the factual background in Crown, Cork 
& Seal, see Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 21, at 541–43. 
 129. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554. 
 130. Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 354. At least as a matter of federal 
decisional law, this rule only applies with respect to the first putative class action 
that is filed; putative class members cannot “stack” or “piggyback” subsequent 
class actions to extend the tolling period. See Basch v. Ground Round, Inc., 139 
F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Plaintiffs may not stack one class action on top of 
another and continue to toll the statute of limitations indefinitely.”); Salazar-
Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass’n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1350 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“Plaintiffs have no authority for their contention that putative class members may 
piggyback one class action onto another and thus toll the statute of limitations 
indefinitely, nor have we found any.”). Moreover, when an individual chooses to 
file his or her own lawsuit before the class certification issue has been resolved in 
the putative class action relied upon for tolling purposes, some courts have held 
that such an individual is not entitled to any tolling benefit at all. See, e.g., In re 
Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 497 F.3d 1005, 1025–27 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 566–69 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir. 1983). But see Caleb Brown, 
Note, Piped In: The Tenth Circuit Weighs In on Extending American Pipe Tolling 
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Boellstorff, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 
793, 800–09 (2010) (discussing conflicting holdings on this issue and arguing that 




B. Class Action Tolling in Personal Injury Litigation 
Both American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal addressed 
whether limitations periods for asserting federal causes of action had 
been tolled by the filing of putative class actions in federal court.131 
In putative personal injury class actions, however, state law will 
supply the rules of decision and the applicable statutes of 
limitations—even though such cases are increasingly being 
aggregated in federal court via the MDL statute.132 Although there 
has been some debate about whether the tolling doctrine announced 
by the Supreme Court in American Pipe should be limited to federal 
causes of action or instead apply broadly to any class action filed in 
federal court,133 most courts now agree that “a federal court 
evaluating the timeliness of state law claims must look to the law of 
the relevant state to determine whether, and to what extent, the 
statute of limitations should be tolled by the filing of a putative class 
action in another jurisdiction.”134 In mass tort MDLs that may 
contain claims by individual plaintiffs from all 50 states, the most 
                                                                                                             
 
“American Pipe tolling should be extended to cover independent suits filed prior 
to class certification”). 
 131. See supra notes 125, 128. 
 132. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 21, at 545–68. For example, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has interpreted the tolling rule of 
American Pipe as a principle of federal common law that applies by its own force 
in federal court (including in diversity cases) regardless of the applicable state law 
on tolling. See In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 391 F.3d 907, 
915 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he federal interest in ‘the efficiency and economy of the 
class-action procedure’ outweighs any state interest and therefore justifies tolling 
in diversity cases where the otherwise-applicable state law provides no relief.”) 
(quoting Adams Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Asbestos Corp., 7 F.3d 717, 718–19 (8th Cir. 
1993)). 
 134. Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc., 653 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that 
“the majority of our sister courts that have addressed the issue” have reached this 
conclusion). See also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 897, 907 
(E.D. La. 2007) (“In diversity cases, where state law provides the rules of 
decision, ‘a federal court should apply not only state statutes of limitations but also 
any accompanying tolling rules.’ Indeed, it has been recognized that American 
Pipe does not apply by its own force in diversity cases.” (quoting Vaught v. 
Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir. 1997))); Orleans Parish Sch. 
Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 892 F. Supp. 794, 805 (E.D. La. 1995) (“The limitations 
periods of American Pipe and Crown, Cork were derived from federal statutes. 
Here we are dealing with Hawaii’s limitation statutes. Because none of them 
provide for tolling in a situation such as exists here, it is doubtful that either 
American Pipe or Crown, Cork can be treated as applicable precedent.”). 




obvious impact of the majority view is that it exponentially 
complicates the tolling inquiry for transferee courts.135 
Looking to state law then, one finds that many states have 
adopted class action tolling as a matter of state law, often offering 
no other justification for doing so beyond those annunciated by the 
Supreme Court in American Pipe.136 That said, some states have not 
adopted class action tolling,137 and states often take different views 
with respect to “cross-jurisdictional” class action tolling—that is, 
whether a class action filed in federal court or in a different state’s 
court system tolls the statute of limitations for an individual that 
subsequently files suit in state court in the forum state.138 
                                                                                                             
 135. See, e.g., In re Vioxx, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 902  (“Given that this MDL 
currently contains cases transferred from every State in the Union, and that federal 
jurisdiction in these cases is premised on diversity of citizenship, the Court could 
conceivably be faced with the task of applying each state’s statute of limitations in 
this multidistrict litigation.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 905 A.2d 340, 355 (Md. 
Ct. App. 2006) (“We adopt the American Pipe class action tolling rule, and its 
extension in Crown, Cork & Seal.”); Ling v. Webb, 834 N.E.2d 1137, 1141–42 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (relying on American Pipe to conclude that “the 
commencement of a class action lawsuit tolls the applicable statute of limitations 
during the period between the filing of the action and the trial court’s ruling on the 
question of class certification”); Am. Tierra Corp. v. City of W. Jordan, 840 P.2d 
757, 762 (Utah 1992) (adopting class action tolling “to avoid duplication of 
litigation, promote justice, do equity, and generally further the judicial efficiency 
and economy that class actions are designed to promote”); Grant v. Austin Bridge 
Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (relying on American Pipe 
and Crown, Cork & Seal to hold that “the filing of the class action suspends the 
applicable statute of limitations as [to] all purported members of the class”); White 
v. Sims, 470 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Ala. 1985) (“[W]e hold that the commencement 
of a class action tolls the statute of limitations until such time as an independent 
action is filed, or until the denial of class certification, whichever may first 
occur.”); see also, e.g., Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 286–87 (4th Cir. 
1999) (collecting authorities); Staub v. Eastman Kodak Co., 726 A.2d 955, 963–
64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (collecting authorities). 
 137. See Wade, 182 F.3d at 287 (noting that Virginia has not adopted the class 
action tolling doctrine); Highland Park Ass’n of Bus. & Enters. v. Abramson, 91 
F.3d 143 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (recognizing that Kentucky 
has never adopted the American Pipe doctrine). 
 138. Compare Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 160 
(Ohio 2002) (allowing a putative class action filed in federal court to toll the 
statute of limitations for a plaintiff that subsequently filed an individual lawsuit in 
Ohio state court), with Quinn v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 118 So. 3d 
1011, 1020 (La. 2012) (holding that “the suspension of prescription” provided by 
Article 596 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure “applies only to petitions 
brought on behalf of a class in the state courts of Louisiana”) (internal quotation 
omitted), Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc., 722 S.E.2d 842, 845 (Va. 2012) (“[T]here is 
no authority in Virginia jurisprudence for the equitable tolling of a statute of 
limitations based upon the pendency of a putative class action in another 
jurisdiction.”), Ravitch v. Pricewaterhouse, 793 A.2d 939, 945 (Pa. Super. Ct. 




Moreover, tolling itself operates in different ways in different 
states and it is well established that “when federal courts look to 
state law to provide the limitations period, they must also do so to 
determine the effect on that limitations period once class 
certification has been denied.”139 Therefore, if an MDL transferee 
court determines that the applicable state law recognizes class action 
tolling, the court must then also determine how that tolling actually 
functions. Under state law, “[t]hree general tolling effects are 
possible: 1) suspension, 2) extension, and 3) renewal or revival.”140 
Under suspension, the plaintiff must file suit within the 
amount of time left in the limitation period on the day tolling 
took place. . . . The extension rule establishes fixed periods 
during which the plaintiff may file suit without regard to the 
length of the original limitation period or the amount of time 
left when the tolling began. . . . [Finally,] tolling may renew 
or revive the limitation period, giving the plaintiff the benefit 
of an entirely fresh time period.141 
Although a detailed discussion of these various tolling effects is 
beyond the scope of this Article, the important points are that (1) 
state law governs tolling in personal injury cases and (2) that body 
of law consists of a complicated patchwork of tolling principles that 
differ from state to state. In short, MDL transferee courts must 
recognize that class action tolling is alive and well as a matter of 
                                                                                                             
 
2002) (holding that “the filing of a class action in another state does not toll the 
statute of limitations as to a subsequent action filed in Pennsylvania’s state court 
system”), Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 807–08 (Tenn. 
2000) (noting that Tennessee will not toll its statutes of limitations “pending a 
judicial outcome in a foreign jurisdiction”), and Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 
N.E.2d 1102, 1103–05 (Ill. 1998) (rejecting cross-jurisdictional class action 
tolling). For a broad overview of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, see 
generally David Bober, Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling: When and Whether a State 
Court Should Toll Its Statute of Limitations Based on the Filing of a Class Action 
in Another Jurisdiction, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 617 (2002). 
 139. Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 21, at 544 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983)). 
 140. Kathleen L. Cerveny, Note, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied: 
Chardon v. Fumero Soto and Alice in Wonderland, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 686, 
689 (1985). 
 141. Id. at 689–90 (internal citations omitted). See also Barasich v. Shell 
Pipeline Co., No. 05-4180, 2008 WL 6468611, at *6 n.7 (E.D. La. June 19, 2008) 
(recognizing that “[t]he denial of class certification has the effect of re-starting the 
running of prescription, and at this point, putative class members may choose to 
file their own suits, provided that those actions are instituted within the time that 
remains on the limitations period, or may elect to intervene as plaintiffs in the 
pending action”). 




state law in various jurisdictions and should take steps to ensure that 
the class action tolling doctrine does not frustrate the fair and 
efficient resolution of modern mass tort litigation. 
C. Class Action Tolling Can Undermine Efforts to Resolve Mass 
Tort Litigation 
Although some states have established specialized statutes of 
limitations for specified causes of action (such as medical 
malpractice claims and wrongful death claims), most states utilize 
one-, two-, or three-year statutes of limitations for personal injury 
claims,142 though a few states employ longer limitations periods for 
such claims.143 As the Supreme Court explained long ago, “such 
statutes ‘promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival 
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’”144 
Thus, statutes of limitations are premised on the idea “that even if 
one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to 
defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of 
stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute 
them.”145 Class action tolling obviously frustrates this basic policy. 
                                                                                                             
 142. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (2011) (establishing one-year 
prescriptive period for personal injury and wrongful death claims); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 28-3-104 (Westlaw 2013) (establishing one-year limitations period for 
personal injury claims premised on theories of negligence and strict liability); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(1)(a) (Westlaw 2013) (establishing one-year 
limitations period for personal injury claims); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2) 
(Westlaw 2013) (establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury and 
wrongful death claims); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202 (West 2011) 
(establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury claims); ALA. CODE § 
6-2-38 (Westlaw 2013) (establishing two-year limitations period for personal 
injury claims); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (West 2002) 
(establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury claims); CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 335.1 (West 2006) (establishing two-year limitations period for 
personal injury and wrongful death claims); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2 (Westlaw 
2013) (establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury claims). 
 143. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(a) (Westlaw 2013) (establishing 
four-year limitations period for personal injury claims founded on negligence); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 516.120(4) (Westlaw 2013) (establishing five-year limitations 
period for personal injury claims); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-16(5) 
(Westlaw 2013) (establishing six-year limitations period for personal injury 
claims); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (Westlaw 2013) (establishing a 
general six-year limitations period for all civil actions). 
 144. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting Order 
of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944)). 
 145. Id. (quoting Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348–49); see also Wasserman, 
supra note 120, at 811–12 (discussing other interests that statutes of limitations 
serve). 




In both American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal, the Supreme 
Court was concerned that its failure to adopt a class action tolling 
rule would lead to a “needless multiplicity of actions”146 and would 
“deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of 
litigation which is a principal purpose of the [class action] 
procedure.”147 In short, the Court’s tolling rule was premised on the 
view that the class action device might obviate the need for 
individualized litigation—Thus, until class certification was denied, 
individuals were encouraged to sit tight and not burden the courts 
with “unnecessary filing of repetitious papers.”148 But with the 
demise of personal injury litigation classes in the wake of Amchem 
and the emergence of multidistrict litigation, bellwether trials, and 
private mass tort settlements (not to mention electronic filing of 
court documents), the justification for class action tolling relied 
upon by the Supreme Court in 1974 has vanished in the personal 
injury context. Today, class action tolling for putative members of 
putative personal injury class actions actually threatens to 
undermine the laudable goal of “litigative efficiency.”149 
In contemporary mass tort litigation, requiring personal injury 
claimants to come forward individually in a timely fashion is not 
inefficient. At worst, if such plaintiffs file cases in local courts 
around the country, the JPML must order them transferred to the 
federal MDL forum as “tag-along” actions and the transferee court’s 
clerk’s office will be required to create new dockets for each 
individual case that comes into the MDL.150 Alternatively, the 
transferee court (with the agreement of the defendant(s)) may allow 
individual plaintiffs to file cases directly into the federal MDL, 
regardless of venue constraints.151  Direct filing into an MDL 
“avoids the expense and delay associated with plaintiffs filing in 
                                                                                                             
 146. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 351 (1983). 
 147. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974). 
 148. Id. at 550. 
 149. Id. at 556. 
 150. See Heyburn, supra note 7, at 2233 n.41 (“Panel Rule 1.1 defines tag-
along action as ‘a civil action pending in a district court and involving common 
questions of fact with actions previously transferred under Section 1407.’”). 
 151. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903–04 (E.D. 
La. 2007) (discussing a pretrial order that recognized the defendant’s agreement 
not to assert “any objection of improper venue” as to “cases filed directly in the 
Eastern District of Louisiana that emanate from districts outside the Eastern 
District of Louisiana”); see also In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater 
Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Dec. 
17, 2010) (Pretrial Order No. 20), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov 
/OilSpill/Orders/PTO20.pdf (authorizing direct filing “to eliminate the delays 
associated with transfer of cases filed in or removed to other U.S. District Courts, 
and to promote judicial efficiency”). 




local federal courts around the country after the creation of an MDL 
and waiting for the [JPML] to transfer these ‘tag-a-long’ actions” to 
the transferee court.152 Or defendants may be willing to enter into 
tolling agreements with individual plaintiffs that eliminate the need 
for such plaintiffs to file lawsuits altogether.153 The key point is that, 
whichever method is utilized, requiring individual plaintiffs to come 
forward does not burden the transferee judge or create inefficiencies 
in modern practice. 
Moreover, this “multiplicity of actions” is essentially a 
prerequisite to the successful implementation of aggregate non-class 
settlements, which themselves are becoming increasingly 
ubiquitous.154 As previously explained, “private mass tort 
settlements are only open to ‘eligible’ plaintiffs—that is, plaintiffs 
with pending claims as of a date certain, often the date on which the 
initial contract between plaintiffs’ liaison counsel and the 
defendant(s) is announced.”155 It is perhaps obvious, but in order to 
make an appropriate aggregate settlement offer, the defendant needs 
to know approximately how many plaintiffs are asserting claims 
(and will therefore be dividing the aggregate settlement fund). 
Similarly, in order to be comfortable with making an aggregate 
settlement offer in the first place, most defendants will insist on 
some degree of certainty regarding the likelihood of future claims 
being filed after the settlement is announced. 
For example, in the Vioxx pharmaceutical MDL, Merck first 
filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a definitive ruling on 
the applicability of American Pipe tolling on September 22, 2006—
several months before the transferee court and several coordinating 
state court judges suggested that the parties begin settlement 
discussions. The transferee court denied Merck’s motion on March 
22, 2007, in light of the “existence of factual disputes regarding both 
the triggering and tolling of the various limitations periods.”156 
Seven months later, in late October 2007, Merck filed three 
additional motions for summary judgment again seeking guidance 
concerning whether various states’ statutes of limitations would be 
found to have run out or instead been tolled by the class action 
tolling doctrine. In subsequent hearings and conferences, Merck’s 
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counsel left no doubt that such guidance was critical to Merck’s 
settlement calculus. On November 8, 2007, recognizing that “the 
litigation [had] matured,” the transferee court resolved Merck’s 
renewed motions and held that various statutes of limitations had 
expired; in doing so, the court made clear that it would take a 
circumscribed approach to class action tolling—only applying the 
doctrine in limited circumstances that had been specifically 
authorized by the applicable state courts.157 One day later, on 
November 9, 2007, the landmark $4.85 billion private mass tort 
settlement in the Vioxx litigation was publicly announced. 
Private mass tort settlements tend to occur after several years of 
litigation, during which time the applicable statutes of limitations 
should be running on potential claimants, such that defendants can 
theoretically take comfort in knowing in which states the door is 
“closed” before announcing a settlement offer. But class action 
tolling allows potential claimants who would otherwise have waited 
too long to file suit an extended period of time to come forward and 
thereby prevents defendants from having any such comfort.158 In an 
era where litigation classes are no longer certified, the resulting 
uncertainty about the scope of a defendant’s future liability cannot 
be justified and is likely to either delay or completely frustrate 
settlement efforts. 
IV. MDL TRANSFEREE COURTS SHOULD SHORT-CIRCUIT THE CLASS 
ACTION TOLLING DOCTRINE 
All is not lost, however, and MDL transferee courts need not 
wait for the Supreme Court and/or state courts of last resort to revisit 
their class action tolling holdings. Instead, by expeditiously issuing a 
short pretrial order that relies on the national trend rejecting 
certification of personal injury litigation classes,159 transferee courts 
can short-circuit the class action tolling doctrine and maximize the 
chances for a fair and efficient resolution of mass tort multidistrict 
litigation without limiting the settlement approaches that can be 
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employed once the litigation has matured. This Part begins by 
offering a proposed structure for such an “omnibus class action 
pretrial order” and explains why this type of order will not have 
collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent request for certification of 
one or more settlement classes. The Part then concludes by 
discussing several associated issues that may arise under the Class 
Action Fairness Act (CAFA) in connection with the issuance of an 
omnibus class action pretrial order.160 
A. Omnibus Denial of Class Action Status for Putative Litigation 
Classes 
In light of the persistence of the class action tolling doctrine, the 
common-sense triage approach of transferee courts to defer 
consideration of class action issues in mass tort MDLs carries the 
unintended consequence of possibly delaying or completely 
preventing a successful resolution of such litigations by injecting 
uncertainty about both the current and future plaintiff populations. 
Accordingly, transferee courts should reexamine their current 
tendency to defer consideration of class action issues in mass tort 
MDLs and instead issue an omnibus class action pretrial order at the 
inception of any MDL that contains at least one putative personal 
injury class action. That omnibus order should do at least four 
things: (i) strike all current and future personal injury class 
allegations from all current and future complaints in the MDL; (ii) 
deny all current and future requests for personal injury claims to be 
certified as litigation classes; (iii) explicitly provide that the purpose 
of the order is to suspend any and all tolling of the applicable 
statute(s) of limitations that might otherwise occur as a result of the 
class action tolling doctrine; and (iv) make clear that the parties are 
not precluded from subsequently seeking certification of one or 
more settlement classes. 
Although an omnibus class action pretrial order could be crafted 
in many different ways to accomplish these central purposes, some 
exemplary language is set forth below by way of illustration: 
  This Order shall govern all cases (1) transferred to this 
Court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
(“JPML”) pursuant to its Order of [insert date of initial 
JPML Order creating the MDL proceeding]; (2) any tag-
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along actions subsequently transferred to this Court by the 
JPML pursuant to Rule 7.4 of the Rules of Procedure of that 
Panel; and (3) all related cases originally filed in this Court 
or otherwise transferred or removed to this Court. 
  To facilitate the efficient and effective management and 
prosecution of the coordinated actions in this MDL and to 
minimize any potentially harmful impacts of the class action 
tolling doctrine, 
  (i) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, in light of the 
overwhelming weight of authority rejecting the certification 
of personal injury claims as class actions for purposes of 
adjudication pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, (a) paragraphs of 
the complaint in [insert paragraph references and case 
captions for any complaints filed in cases currently in the 
MDL that contain personal injury class action allegations] 
which contain personal injury class action allegations, are 
hereby STRICKEN and (b) any similar paragraphs 
containing personal injury class action allegations in 
complaints in any tag-along actions subsequently transferred 
to this Court by the JPML pursuant to Rule 7.4 of the Rules 
of Procedure of that Panel or any related cases that are 
subsequently originally filed in this Court or otherwise 
transferred or removed to this Court are DEEMED 
STRICKEN by operation of this Order as of the date that 
such tag-along actions or related cases join this MDL. 
  (ii) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the 
overwhelming weight of authority rejecting the certification 
of personal injury claims as class actions for purposes of 
adjudication pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, (a) the requests 
for class certification contained in [insert references to any 
pending motions in cases currently in the MDL for 
certification of personal injury claims as litigation classes, 
regardless of whether those motions were filed before or 
after the cases joined the MDL] are DENIED, (b) any 
similar motions for certification of personal injury claims as 
litigation classes that may be filed in this Court in the future 
in any tag-along actions subsequently transferred to this 
Court by the JPML pursuant to Rule 7.4 of the Rules of 
Procedure of that Panel or any related cases that are 
subsequently originally filed in this Court or otherwise 
transferred or removed to this Court are DEEMED DENIED 
by operation of this Order as of the date that such motions 
are filed, and (c) any similar motions for certification of 
personal injury claims as litigation classes that are, or may 
already have been, filed in any tag-along actions 




subsequently transferred to this Court by the JPML pursuant 
to Rule 7.4 of the Rules of Procedure of that Panel or any 
related cases that are subsequently originally filed in this 
Court or otherwise transferred or removed to this Court prior 
to any such tag-along actions or related cases joining this 
MDL are DEEMED DENIED by operation of this Order as 
of the date that such tag-along actions or related cases join 
this MDL. 
  (iii) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order does 
not preclude any party from subsequently seeking 
certification of one or more settlement classes pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
  The provisions of this Order are provisional and may be 
modified in the interests of justice, expedience, or judicial 
economy on the Court’s own motion or upon motion by any 
party for good cause shown. 
Prior to issuing an omnibus class action pretrial order along 
these lines, the transferee court should consider asking liaison 
counsel to review the complaints and dockets in all cases that 
comprise the MDL (including all pending cases that were 
transferred by the JPML to the transferee court in the JPML’s initial 
order creating the MDL and all pending cases that were originally 
filed in or otherwise transferred or removed to the transferee court) 
to ensure both that (i) any paragraphs in those complaints containing 
personal injury class action allegations and (ii) any motions for class 
certification that may have been filed in any such cases are 
referenced in the applicable provisions of the omnibus class action 
pretrial order. Of course, in addition to relying on liaison counsel, 
the transferee court may also wish to conduct its own review of 
these materials prior to issuing an omnibus class action pretrial 
order. 
Although the omnibus class action pretrial order proposed above 
could be entered by transferee courts sua sponte, MDL defendants 
would be well advised to make a habit of requesting such relief to 
ensure that the pendency of personal injury class allegations is 
immediately brought to the attention of transferee courts.161 Notably, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that the 
fact that a “motion to strike came before the plaintiffs had filed a 
motion to certify the class does not by itself make the court’s 
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decision reversibly premature.”162 Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that although class certification issues generally involve 
“considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues 
comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action . . . [s]ometimes the issues 
are plain enough from the pleadings.”163 Today, based on a long line 
of well-reasoned precedent, it is “plain enough” that personal injury 
claims cannot be certified as litigation classes. 
B. Parties Can Subsequently Seek Certification of Settlement 
Classes 
Given that mass tort litigation continues to occasionally be 
resolved via class action settlements, MDL transferee courts must be 
careful not to prematurely cut off the parties’ ability to use the class 
action device to achieve global resolution if it is desired and 
appropriate. Provided that it is structured properly, however, the 
omnibus class action pretrial order proposed above will not have 
preclusive effect nor prevent the parties from seeking certification of 
(or the court from certifying) a subsequent settlement class for two 
reasons.164 
First, as an initial matter, Rule 23(c)(1)(C) provides that “[a]n 
order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or 
amended before final judgment.”165 Thus, it has been argued that “as 
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a nonfinal decision that can be reviewed at any time during the 
proceeding, [such an order] cannot be afforded the ‘definiteness’ of 
preclusion.”166 Second, even if the omnibus class action pretrial 
order could be considered final, it would have no preclusive effect 
on later efforts to certify a settlement class because the Rule 23 
inquiry for settlement classes differs from the inquiry for litigation 
classes.167 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Smith v. Bayer is 
instructive on this point and leaves no doubt that an omnibus class 
action pretrial order crafted along the lines proposed above would 
not prevent the subsequent certification of a settlement class.168 In 
Smith, the Supreme Court held that a federal court’s denial of class 
certification under Rule 23 does not preclude the same putative 
plaintiff class from subsequently seeking certification in state court 
under a state-law analog of Rule 23 (provided that the state-law 
analog is not identical to Rule 23).169 Given that the Rule 23 
analysis is different for litigation and settlement classes, the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smith suggests that an order denying 
certification of a litigation class would not prevent the exact same 
putative class from later seeking certification of a settlement class. 
Thus, regardless of the increasing rarity of class action settlements 
in mass tort litigation, MDL transferee courts can issue an omnibus 
class action pretrial order without prematurely cutting off the 
parties’ subsequent ability to seek to use the class action device to 
implement a global settlement. 
C. CAFA Considerations 
As noted above, there is a general prohibition against “stacking” 
class actions for purposes of tolling.170 In other words, it is typically 
only the first putative class action that is filed that can toll the 
applicable statute(s) of limitations for putative members of that 
class—Any subsequent related putative class actions that are filed 
are generally irrelevant for purposes of tolling. Therefore, it is at 
least theoretically possible that the operative putative class action for 
tolling purposes in any given MDL (i.e., the first such case to be 
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filed) may remain in state court for jurisdictional reasons and not be 
subject to the omnibus class action pretrial order proposed above. 
However, CAFA has largely minimized the potential harm 
associated with this theoretical possibility. 
CAFA’s expanded minimal diversity provisions ensure that 
most multistate and nationwide putative class actions are now 
removable to federal court and, thus, subject to MDL 
consolidation.171 In very general terms, the only putative class 
actions likely to remain in state court in the mass tort context post-
CAFA are single-state class actions—that is, putative classes 
defined to include only individuals from the forum state.172 Thus, in 
the post-CAFA world, it is extremely unlikely for any putative class 
action with the potential to toll the applicable statutes of limitations 
for mass tort plaintiffs from multiple states to remain in state court. 
Rather, the more likely scenario is that, for a given mass tort, 
plaintiffs from several states may enjoy the benefits of tolling by 
virtue of the filing of a single-state putative class action in their 
home state that is not removable under CAFA—provided, of course, 
that the relevant state courts do not immediately strike such personal 
injury class allegations or otherwise expeditiously deny class action 
status to those cases.173 
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Finally, it should also be noted that transferee courts need not 
worry that, by issuing an omnibus class action pretrial order, they 
may unwittingly lose subject matter jurisdiction over putative class 
actions in the MDL that have been filed or removed solely upon the 
basis of CAFA’s minimal diversity provisions. Shortly after CAFA 
was enacted, some district courts initially concluded that because 
CAFA’s expanded minimal diversity provision applies “to any class 
action before or after the entry of a class certification order by the 
court with respect to that action”174 and given that a “class 
certification order” is defined as “an order issued by a court 
approving the treatment of some or all aspects of a civil action as a 
class action,”175 then the subject matter jurisdiction conferred by 
CAFA must be lost after denial of class certification because the 
case is “no longer a class action.”176 But the federal courts of 
appeals have now weighed in and made clear that the denial of class 
certification does not strip courts of subject matter jurisdiction under 
CAFA.177 As Judge Posner explained, this is because “jurisdiction 
attaches when a suit is filed as a class action, and that invariably 
precedes certification.”178 Accordingly, the issuance of an omnibus 
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class action pretrial order will not undermine an MDL transferee 
court’s jurisdiction over putative class actions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding that personal injury claims are no longer 
certified as litigation classes, the pesky persistence of the class 
action tolling doctrine allows potential mass tort plaintiffs’ 
individual statutes of limitations to be tolled in many jurisdictions 
by virtue of nothing more than the filing of a putative personal 
injury class action in a related case—provided that courts do not 
immediately strike such class allegations or otherwise deny class 
action status to personal injury claims as soon as they become aware 
of them. And in contemporary multidistrict litigation, which is 
increasingly being resolved by non-class aggregate settlements, it is 
simply not the case that “a little tolling never hurt anyone.” Rather, 
by permitting and/or encouraging potential plaintiffs to sit in the 
shadows and not come forward to assert their claims, the class 
action tolling doctrine can delay and altogether undermine efforts to 
resolve modern mass tort litigation by creating disabling uncertainty 
about current and future plaintiff populations. 
Accordingly, this Article has proposed that transferee courts 
should reexamine their current tendency to defer consideration of 
class action issues in mass tort MDLs. Instead, transferee courts 
should issue an “omnibus class action pretrial order” at the inception 
of any MDL that contains at least one putative personal injury class 
action. That omnibus order should do at least four things: (i) strike 
all current and future personal injury class allegations from all 
current and future complaints in the MDL; (ii) deny all current and 
future requests for personal injury claims to be certified as litigation 
classes; (iii) explicitly provide that the purpose of the order is to 
suspend any and all tolling of the applicable statute(s) of limitations 
that might otherwise occur as a result of the class action tolling 
doctrine; and (iv) make clear that the parties are not precluded from 
subsequently seeking certification of one or more settlement classes. 
Such an order would short-circuit any harmful impact that the class 
action tolling doctrine might otherwise impose without precluding 
the parties from subsequently seeking to use the class action device 
to implement a global settlement, and it is a modest modification of 
current MDL practice that should be implemented in mass tort 
cases. 
  
